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 We present key aspects of the federated access control 
solution required for the Earth System Grid Federation 
(ESGF), including a standard mechanism for securing 
OPeNDAP-based services and corresponding extensions to 
the NetCDF software libraries to support this paradigm. 
 ESGF is an international collaboration to enable 
access to Earth science data – beginning with a deployment 
in support of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, 
phase 5, a framework of climate model experiments whose 
results will be available in a distributed, globally accessible 
archive.   By maintaining a separation of concerns between 
the various aspects of the system, it has been possible to 
devise a highly flexible access control architecture 
adaptable to the spectrum of needs presented.  Such a 
modular approach is only possible through the definition of 
interfaces: at the inter-organisational level with web 
services and at the application level with the use of server 
side middleware and REST-based principles. 
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1 Introduction 
 The production, evaluation and interpretation of 
climate model simulations are integral activities within 
Earth system science. Since the very first General 
Circulation Models run more than forty years ago, to the 
very latest Earth System Model simulations running now as 
part of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, phase 5 
(CMIP5), these activities have always been on the leading 
edge of computing. As the models have improved, adding 
more internal processes, and running at higher resolution, 
so has the volume of data produced increased. 
 CMIP5, organised under the auspices of the World 
Climate Research Programme (WCRP), will deliver science 
that will feed into the next Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report. As such, the 
analysis and interpretation will be a global activity, 
requiring global access to petascale data archives held on 
multiple continents. Traditional centralised archive 
solutions will clearly not suffice. 
 In order to address this challenge, a global federation 
– the Earth System Grid Federation (ESGF) has been built 
on the nucleus of the U.S. Earth System Grid Center for 
Enabling Technologies (ESG-CET)
[1]
.  The ESGF was 
established to cope with data production at O(25) sites 
globally conforming to O(50) distinct numerical 
experiments and resulting in O(100,000) years of simulated 
climate corresponding to O(6500) years of the real-world 
climate. 
 A key tenet of the design philosophy of CMIP5 was to 
identify the “core” output from the simulations – that is the 
data which was likely to see the most analysis by scientists. 
The consequential key requirement for ESGF has been to 
maximise the exposure of that core data (expected to be 
approximately 2.5 petabytes), even as it exposes all the data 
produced for CMIP5. Thus, ESGF is essentially a 
federation of the originating modelling archives (or their 
proxies), and a number of replicant archives, three of which 
have committed to persist that core data indefinitely. These 
persistent archives will be located at the Program for 
Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison (PCMDI) at 
the U.S. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the 
British Atmospheric Data Centre (BADC) in the UK 
National Centre for Atmospheric Science, and the German 
Climate Computing Centre (DKRZ). ESGF itself is 
described in detail elsewhere
[2]
.  
 The purpose of this paper is to describe particular 
techniques used to design the access control to the data in 
this globally distributed data system.  This presents 
significant challenges highlighted by the heterogeneous 
nature of the environment in which a solution must be 
applied.  This diversity is expressed on a number of levels: 
the range of tools and services used within the climate 
model community, the associated protocols and technology 
stacks employed, and the varied organisational structures 
representative across the federation members.  We focus 
then on various aspects of the security architecture used to 
address these challenges: (1) a service oriented architecture; 
(2) HTTP based services and key applications; (3) the 
NetCDF
[3]
 client implementation of the OPeNDAP
[4]
 
protocol and finally, (4) a walkthrough of a use case for 
data download, illustrating how the various components 
function together in the working system. 
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2 Requirements 
 ESGF has six key requirements that motivated the 
security solutions provided: 
1) Seamless access to data hosted by all organisations in 
the federation, that is, single sign-on such that the 
same credentials can be used across the federation 
2) A mechanism to set policy on restricting access to 
chosen datasets, per dataset on a case by case basis 
3) The ability to notify users of changes to data and 
services. This requires the collection of user attributes 
including e-mail addresses whilst at the same time 
respecting user privacy. 
4) The ability to collect metrics about data download, 
specifically the number of unique downloads. 
5) Seamless integration with multiple interfaces to a 
service or resource, specifically, browser-based access 
and thick client access. 
6) Clean integration with services and tools that 
scientists commonly use. 
 These requirements are considered in turn in the 
following sections, but we begin by outlining the 
overarching deployment environment and architectural 
requirements.  The ESGF architecture defines Data Nodes 
and Gateway Nodes. Data Nodes are sites that host the 
model data and associated access services. Replication 
services enable the CMIP5 core data to be mirrored across 
the key archiving sites and publishing services make that 
data discoverable through Gateways - portals to the system. 
 For requirement (1), we look at the application of a 
service-oriented architecture, and requirements (2), (3) and 
(4) are addressed in attribute management and authorisation 
solutions. For requirement (5), ESGF includes both 
GridFTP
[5]
 and HTTP based data access services. However, 
for the purposes of this paper we concentrate on the 
application of access control functionality to the HTTP 
server side architecture. Finally, requirement (6) focuses on 
work carried out for ESGF to add a standardised access 
control layer to OPeNDAP, which is a core data access 
service for the federation. 
 PCMDI has a lead role for CMIP5, holding the 
delegated authority of the various modelling groups to 
allow access according to their varying access criteria (co-
ordinated by the WCRP). As such it needs to control the 
assignation of CMIP5 access authorisation, on a dataset-by-
dataset basis, to individuals in the user community. Each 
ESGF institution may host CMIP5 datasets other than their 
own, but in doing so they need to honour the PCMDI role, 
even as they retain control over their own datasets, and 
those under other authorisation domains.  Much of the data 
will be available with liberal licensing conditions. ESGF 
currently enforces a simple registration policy for CMIP5 
access, coupled with the requirement for an e-mail address 
that can be validated. Thus, the level of assurance required 
is low in comparison to that of many systems.  Even so, for 
resource providers, the security architecture should provide 
some level of protection for their finite computing assets, 
for example from malicious or unintended requests which 
might overload network or server resources. 
 We emphasise that in order to function as a federation, 
ESGF must have the ability to collect, curate, and publish 
trusted federation service metadata. 
3 Service-Oriented Architecture 
 ESGF is deployed in various locations, alongside 
existing activities. Fundamental then to the development of 
a federated access control infrastructure is the interfaces 
between organisations. A standards-based approach was 
employed wherever practicable to facilitate interoperability 
and ensure the use of peer-reviewed protocols. In this 
section we describe the services and their interfaces, 
looking in turn at authentication and single sign-on, 
attribute management and authorisation. 
3.1 Authentication and Single Sign-on 
  The distributed nature of the ESG architecture meant 
that single sign-on was favoured from the outset as a means 
to simplify access for users and join the user management 
infrastructures of the different participating institutions 
together. The OpenID
[6]
 standard was chosen early by the 
ESG team to provide single sign-on capability
[7]
. An 
evaluation exercise showed that particular vulnerabilities in 
the specification could be addressed by stipulating SSL for 
OpenID Provider endpoints. As a consequence, ESGF 
OpenID Relying Parties are able to utilise SSL-based peer 
authentication to whitelist OpenID Provider identities to a 
given set of registered Identity Providers (IdPs) within the 
federation. The restricted set of IdPs allowed ESGF to 
leverage an agreed set of site attributes, and to enforce trust 
and service level agreements on the IdP. Each ESGF 
Gateway Node hosts an OpenID Identity Provider, where a 
user can register to get a login account. 
 OpenID is augmented with the use of SAML
[8]
 (the 
Security Assertion Mark-up Language) v2.0 with the SOAP 
(Simple Object Access Protocol) binding to provide 
standard interfaces for the various other security services 
required to broker access. As a baseline, all interactions 
with services are secured with Transport Layer Security 
(TLS), with mutual authentication. Whitelisting of client 
certificate subject names enables services to restrict queries 
to a trusted set of retrievers. 
3.1.1 Dual Authentication Mechanisms 
 While OpenID is suited for interaction with browser 
clients, it does not lend itself well to use with thick clients. 
To support the latter, each Gateway Node site runs a 
MyProxy
[9]
 Online CA service.  This can issue short-lived 
X.509 credentials which can be used with PKI-aware 
applications.  The Online CA is backed by the same user 
authentication system as the OpenID service, thus issuing a 
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certificate to any user who has a valid OpenID login. 
Certificates issued from the MyProxy server are configured 
to include the respective OpenID URI in the certificate 
subject name. These credentials are used for authentication 
with GridFTP servers and also HTTP based applications 
including OPeNDAP-based services as will be described 
later in this paper. 
3.2 Attribute Management 
 User attributes are exchanged between trusted parties 
within the federation. They fall into two categories which 
derive directly from requirements (2), (3) and (4) listed in 
Section 2: 
• Site attributes include a limited amount of personal 
user information used for registration and notification 
purposes and are specific to the user’s IdP. 
• Virtual Organisation (VO) attributes include access 
control attributes used to restrict access to data. They 
are scoped for the community and may be assigned at 
some other ESGF authority than their IdP via a 
registration process. 
 VO-level attribute agreements were necessitated for 
two key use cases: access to the distributed CMIP5 data 
archive and bulk replication of data between archiving sites. 
For CMIP5 data access, PCMDI has authority to issue users 
with access rights. For the replication use case, the 
originating site of the data to be replicated has authority. In 
all cases, attributes names are namespace constrained to 
ensure enforcement of the issuing authority. 
3.2.1 Push and Pull Models for Attribute Retrieval 
 As we explored these use cases, it became apparent 
that the system would benefit from both push and pull 
models for the transmission of attributes to consumers. 
Attributes may be pushed at the authentication stage with 
OpenID via the AX (Attribute Exchange) mechanism or 
with PKI based authentication by including a SAML 
assertion as an extension in a user certificate
[11]
. The latter 
was applied for the replication use case where the 
authorisation layer of the GridFTP service, can extract the 
attribute assertion to determine access for a given resource. 
 In some scenarios, a pull model is more suited such as 
where attribute information is required out of band of the 
authentication process or where the source of authority for 
attribute information is not itself an IdP. Any authority such 
as PCMDI, which has responsibilities for a specific data set 
or a group of data sets, may enroll users with the 
corresponding access attributes.  They provide a 
registration interface for this purpose and also a SAML-
based attribute service.  This interface enables consumers to 
query user attribute entitlement. These services are 
associated with the resources they protect, and authorities 
may have users registered with them from a number of 
different IdPs from within the federation
[12]
. Attribute 
Services use whitelist techniques, based on the federation 
trusted service metadata (see Section 3.4), to restrict access 
to user attributes and preserve user privacy. 
3.3 Authorisation Service 
 Each organisation within ESGF that hosts secure 
services (e.g. OPeNDAP or GridFTP), also hosts an 
authorisation service which exposes a SAML interface 
allowing authorised remote entities in the ESGF to query 
for decisions on access to given resources. This service 
supports a pull model to obtain user attributes. A registry 
maps user attribute names onto their respective issuing 
attribute service, so that for example, a resource secured 
with a CMIP5 attribute will trigger a query to the PCMDI 
Attribute Service to verify the user’s entitlement to this 
attribute. 
3.4 Federation Metadata 
 An essential aspect of any federation is the 
establishment and curation of federation credentials, which 
provides the core trust roots of the federation. In the case of 
ESGF, for authentication purposes the following metadata 
is required: 
1) Trusted CA certificates, Signing Policy, and CRLs 
(Certificate Revocation Lists). 
2) The whitelist of OpenID Identity Providers. 
1) is used to validate any certificate chain presented in on a 
TLS channel (both for client to service, and service-to-
service communication). 2) is used by OpenID Relying 
Parties to restrict which IdPs can assert user identities in the 
federation. In addition, the metadata also contains 
information about the various trusted services, including 
attribute and authorisation services, and data download 
services, which may query them. We have defined a 
schema to describe the data, and are in the process of 
building an infrastructure that will allow each organisation 
to own and register their metadata, and obtain the complete 
federation data for their use. 
3.4.1 Service Discovery 
 OpenID 2.0, supports the Yadis
[13]
 protocol whereby a 
HTTP GET request for a user’s OpenID yields an 
eXtensible Resource Descriptor Service (XRDS) document 
containing the service endpoint for the respective OpenID 
Provider. XRDS can be further exploited to advertise 
multiple identity services. This has been leveraged for 
ESGF so that a given user’s OpenID may be introspected to 
discover MyProxy server and attribute service endpoints 
associated with their IdP. 
4 Modular Architecture for HTTP  
Based Services 
 In this section, we describe the architecture adopted 
for integrating security with the HTTP-based access 
services.  Prior to the work with ESGF, lessons drawn from 
previous software development projects at the BADC
[14]
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had highlighted the need for non-intrusive approaches to 
access control for HTTP services - the layering of access 
control functionality over services in such a way as to 
minimise the impact on their existing interfaces. Two 
strong themes emerged: the use of REST
[15]
-based 
principles to govern access control policy and the use of 
Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP)
[16]
 techniques. 
 Security is often cited as an exemplar for AOP. HTTP 
server-side interface specifications like the Python WSGI
[17]
 
(Web Server Gateway Interface) and Java Servlets provide 
a means to layer access control middleware components 
without the need to modify the underlying application.  
This separation of concerns between access control 
functionality and application has further implications. The 
use of a given middleware interface specification constrains 
the range of properties upon which access may be 
determined to within the scope of the parameters of that 
interface, for HTTP: the URI, request method and so on. 
Adopting REST-based principles, URIs may be associated 
with resources to be protected and so a URI based access 
control policy can be realised. This has the advantage of 
performance – request content need not be parsed, only the 
request URI – and clarity: resources to be protected have a 
clear mapping to the URIs by which they are exposed. Not 
all services are easily amenable to this practice, however. 
For example, some operations for OGC 
[18] 
(Open 
Geospatial Consortium) web services require the use of the 
POST method. In such cases the access control middleware 
may need to consume the request message body so as to 
apply a given access policy. 
 A consequence of a URI based access policy is that 
the granularity of the URI scheme must match the 
granularity of access control policy required. In practice 
this has meant some careful consideration of the ESGF URI 
schemes for protected applications and data.  This whole 
philosophy differs in approach to security application 
frameworks that embed access control functionality in the 
application code itself. Whilst they provide flexibility and 
fine-grained control over access, they break the separation 
between application code and access control functionality. 
In general, they cannot be deployed in environments where 
service stacks are maintained and developed independently 
of the security framework. 
 A filter-based architecture also enables the assembly 
of independent middleware components into a pipeline or 
chain since they all adhere to a common interface. This 
characteristic can be exploited to divide up access control 
functionality. For example, HTTP response codes can be 
used to separate the more generic function of flagging an 
unauthenticated request – by setting a HTTP 401 
Unauthorized code – to the more application specific 
function of enforcing some associated response (e.g. 
displaying a sign in user interface). 
4.1 Filter Chain for ESGF Services 
 Filters are defined to perform specific authentication 
and authorization related functions and follow a specific 
order. This is illustrated in figure 1:  
 
Figure 1: HTTP Server Side Filter Chain 
 Two filter chains are shown. The first fronts the 
application to be protected; the second one shown alongside 
it, deals specifically with the authentication process. The 
request from a client goes to the data serving application to 
be accessed, in this case an OPeNDAP service. An 
authentication enforcement filter is first to intercept the 
request. This checks the access restrictions for requested 
resource by consulting the policy. If no restriction is in 
place, control is passed on to the underlying application to 
serve the request. If a secured resource has been requested, 
the filter checks for the presence of a valid session cookie. 
In the absence of this, the client is returned a HTTP 30x 
response requesting redirection to an authentication service 
endpoint (shown on the right in figure 1), which listens over 
HTTPS.   This dual HTTP/HTTPS arrangement allows 
authentication to be executed over a secure channel whilst 
at the same time avoiding the performance penalty 
associated with large data transfers over an encrypted 
connection. 
 The authentication service itself uses a twofold chain 
to enable a client to authenticate with either PKI-based 
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credentials or via OpenID. Notably, with this arrangement, 
the server side is agnostic to the client request method 
employed. The first filter checks for a user X.509 certificate 
obtained from the SSL handshake. If present, authentication 
proceeds based on verification of this identity: otherwise 
control passes to the next filter, which initiates an OpenID 
Relying Party interface. The default behaviour then is to 
assume OpenID-based sign in from a browser but note that 
the response code will be HTTP 401 Unauthorized to signal 
to non-browser-based clients that authentication credentials 
are required.  
 Whatever authentication method is used, a positive 
result will trigger a HTTP 30x redirect response to return 
the client back to the HTTP-based authentication filter. A 
signed authentication cookie is returned with this in the 
HTTP header. The recipient must be within the same 
cookie domain so that the returned cookie is visible to the 
authentication filter fronting the data serving application. 
On receipt of the cookie, this filter verifies it, sets the users 
authenticated status and passes control on to the next filter. 
The sequence in figure 2 illustrates the steps. 
Figure 2: SSL Client Based Authentication with security filters (authorisation filters omitted for this illustration) 
 After the authentication filter, the request is 
intercepted by one or more authorisation filters. Typically, 
a chain will contain at least one SAML-based authorisation 
filter that is responsible for issuing requests to the external 
authorisation service.   This may also enforce the 
authorisation decisions it receives or else delegate this to a 
separate, dedicated enforcement filter. 
4.1.1 Python and Java Implementations 
 A Python implementation, developed at the BADC for 
the NERC (Natural Environment Research Council) 
DataGrid
[14]
, was used to pilot many of the features of the 
filter-based architecture used for ESGF. A parallel Java 
implementation has also been written, which can be used to 
secure a generic web application that runs within a Java 
servlet container. This implementation is deployed widely 
at the ESGF Data Node sites. 
5 Securing OPeNDAP Based Services 
 OPeNDAP is a data access framework widely used in 
the fields of oceanography and atmospheric science 
research, and was a key service to be supported by the 
ESGF security architecture. Data is served over a network 
interface, which abstracts the underlying data format from 
the client, and provides sub-setting functionality.  The 
default Data Node configuration currently uses the 
THREDDS Data Server
[19]
 (TDS) implementation of the 
OPeNDAP protocol. With the server side filter-based 
architecture as described in the previous section, it has been 
possible to configure both TDS and PyDAP
[20]
 based 
OPeNDAP server implementations to support dual OpenID 
and SSL client based authentication mechanisms. 
5.1 Extensions to NetCDF for ESGF 
Security-Aware Clients 
 Whilst the ability to apply this flexible approach to the 
server-side security layer is important, the development of 
compatible client software is vital to the adoption of these 
services across a wide user base. The redirect-based pattern 
with PKI-based credentials makes this solution suitable for 
simple HTTP clients.  Wget, a utility available on most 
UNIX-based systems, can also easily be configured in this 
way. Clearly though, for this solution to have significant 
adoption, the relevant changes would need to be integrated 
into OPeNDAP client libraries. The software libraries for 
NetCDF were an obvious starting point. NetCDF is the 
standard format chosen for CMIP5 data and these are 
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widely used as the basis for client tools in the climate 
science community. By inserting changes at the NetCDF 
level in the software stack, all these dependencies would 
collectively benefit.  
 Working with Unidata, the maker of the NetCDF 
software, the C NetCDF library was adapted to enable 
custom SSL client settings.  These were applied at the level 
of the user’s .dodsrc! file so that no changes to the C 
API were necessary.  Thus existing software that builds on 
the NetCDF libraries requires no change to source code to 
support ESGF-based security, besides relinking with the 
latest version of the libraries. The security extensions are 
included in the NetCDF 4.1.2 release. This has been built 
with a number of different applications including Ferret
[21]
, 
and NetCDF Python bindings
[22]
.  Work is also underway to 
add support to the Java NetCDF client libraries and 
extensions to the PyDAP client libraries have enabled 
PyDAP-based packages like CDX
[23]
 to access ESGF 
hosted data. By instrumenting both NetCDF C/Java and 
PyDAP libraries, we are instantly enabling a large portion 
of the current earth science analysis toolkits with an access 
control layer. 
6 Secured Data Access Walkthrough 
 In this section we present a walkthrough of a typical 
use case to illustrate how the individual components in the 
security architecture interact.   
  
Figure 3: Secured Wget based Data Download 
A user browses for CMIP5 data via the search facility of a 
Gateway Node and discovers data hosted at the BADC’s 
Data Node. Individual datasets may be downloaded directly 
via the browser using OpenID.  Alternatively for multiple 
downloads, an option is provided to generate a data 
download script for the user to download and execute. This 
uses the Wget program to perform the HTTP based 
retrievals. To download secured datasets, the Gateway 
provides a Java MyProxyLogon
[9]
 WebStart program to 
enable users to obtain PKI credentials from MyProxy. The 
credentials are saved to a standard location on the user’s 
file system visible to the Wget script. 
 When the script is called, the various datasets are 
retrieved from the Data Nodes specified in the script 
download URLs. For any given request, the security filters 
fronting the data serving application authenticate the 
request based on the PKI credentials provided and check for 
authorisation by calling the respective authorisation 
services. For CMIP5 data, a given authorisation service will 
check user entitlement with the corresponding authority for 
CMIP5 attribute registration: the PCMDI attribute service. 
If the user is registered, access is granted. 
7 Future Work and Related 
Developments 
 Although the initial deployment of the Earth System 
Grid Federation has been in the context of supporting 
CMIP5, many other applications are expected to be 
deployed with the same infrastructure. Within both Europe 
and the U.S. there are major collaborative projects being 
built around ESGF. Significantly, enabling PKI-based 
authentication, opens up OPeNDAP based services to the 
Grid based security paradigm and in particular user 
delegation using proxy certificates
[24]
. A short NERC-
funded proof-of-concept project MashMyData is exploring 
how OPeNDAP services and an OGC Web Processing 
Service can be coupled together in a workflow leveraging 
the ESGF security infrastructure with support for proxy 
certificates. 
8 Conclusions 
 Modular design principles applied on a number of 
levels through the security architecture have resulted in a 
highly flexible solution applicable to the target domain 
whilst at the same time minimising the impact on the 
underlying APIs of existing services and tools.  
 The extensive use of existing standards in the service-
oriented architecture has facilitated interoperability, with 
Python and Java implementations of services freely 
interchangeable. The filter-based HTTP server side 
architecture has enabled the same access control solution to 
be applied over a range of applications. It has also made 
possible a flexible approach to access control configuration 
where any given application may be fronted with multiple 
authentication and authorisation schemes. This is 
demonstrated by dual OpenID- and PKI-based 
authentication support. The latter, by exploiting 
characteristics inherent in HTTP/HTTPS, has minimised 
the entry point for client side tools to support it. This has 
meant that the user community can turn to simple freely 
available tools such as Wget to access secured data within 
8 Int'l Conf. Grid Computing and Applications |  GCA'11  |
ESGF. Moreover, by applying security extensions to 
NetCDF, a software library used widely across the Earth 
science community, all the dependent software packages 
and tools built on it are enabled with the security support. 
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